INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) has been a statistical terra incognita. As distinct from other countries under communism, the DPRK has made hardly any data-manipulated or not-available to the world. However, in 1989, the government provided some information to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Eberstadt and Banister (1992) were among the few researchers ever to have received permission to cite and use population data from the North Korean government. Data ---pertain to the years 1987/88, and were originally made available to the UNFPA in preparation for the 1994 North Korean census, the last before the 2008 census, when the UNFPA technically assisted the government to carry out a national census. That census was officially labelled the 1993 census, but was actually carried out in early 1994, so data in fact pertain to the year 1994 (Eberstadt 2007). More importantly, some doubts have been cast on the reliability of these census data-which, until now, have provided perhaps the most detailed information we have on the North Korean state. Eberstadt and Banister (1992) had already suggested that for reasons of military security, the government did not report a large number of males in its data. This problem of the 'missing males' may have distorted the findings of the 1994 census. Considering that North Korea has one of the largest armies in the world-where one out of five males was under arms at that time-one might not even speak of true 'population data' but of mere sample statistics. Moreover, it is commonly known that states with a command economy often manipulate their data. For instance, in the case of the two Germanies, it has been found that the Eastern, non-democratic half falsified its production data by reclassifying watermelons as vegetables instead of fruit for political reasons (Kraemer 1998). Hence, it may be generally accepted that statistical data from totalitarian states are a source of controversy.
In fall 2008, the UNFPA in co-operation with South Korea conducted another national census in North Korea, at an estimated cost of about US$5.6 million. Even before the implementation of the census, doubts were cast on this project as well, prompted not only by the 'missing-male' experiences of the previous census, but also by a great famine in the mid-1990s, in which a large number of North Koreans are believed to have starved or to have escaped to China.
3 There is therefore some doubt that the government will provide accurate information on its socio-economic and demographic state this time, as the magnitude of the food crisis and the extent of the enormous ---
